Abstract. In this paper we study dynamic pricing mechanisms of financial derivatives. A typical model of such pricing mechanism is the so-called g-expectation defined by solutions of a backward stochastic differential equation with g as its generating function. Black-Scholes pricing model is a special linear case of this pricing mechanism. We are mainly concerned with two types of pricing mechanisms in an option market: the market pricing mechanism through which the market prices of options are produced, and the ask-bid pricing mechanism operated through the system of market makers. The later one is a typical nonlinear pricing mechanism. Data of prices produced by these two pricing mechanisms are usually quoted in an option market.
Introduction
How to quantitatively describe the pricing mechanism of a market of derivatives is a very interesting problem. A model of dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives is formulated (see (A1)-(A4) in the next section) to characterize this pricing behavior.
We are mainly concerned with two types of pricing mechanisms in an option market: the market pricing mechanism which outputs the trading prices of options and the bid-ask pricing mechanism operated according the system of market makers. We stress here that, in our point of view, the ask prices and the bid prices quoted in a market are determined by a single pricing mechanism. The difference of a ask price and the corresponding bid price, called bid-ask spread, reflects the nonlinearity of this mechanism. The data of prices of above mentioned two pricing systems is usually systematically quoted in the internet thus the models under our investigation can be statistically tested. We hope that our modelling can also be applied to describe the pricing mechanism of some other financial institutions.
The well-known Black-Scholes formula is a typical model of dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives. It is a linear pricing mechanism. In fact, the prices produced by this mechanism is solved by a linear Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE). This means that the corresponding generating function g of the BSDE is a linear function. Nonlinear pricing model by BSDE was proposed in [24] (cf. [27] ). In this paper we show that each well-defined BSDE with a fixed generating function g forms a dynamic pricing mechanism, called g-expectation and that the behaviors of this mechanism are perfectly characterized by the behaviors of g. Several conditions of equivalence provided in this paper will be very helpful to characterize and to find the generating function, or in some other circumstances, to regulate or to design a pricing mechanism.
A very interesting problem is how to design a test procedure to verify whether an existing pricing mechanism of derivatives is a g-expectation. We will present the following result: if a dynamic pricing mechanism is uniformly dominated by a g µ -expectation with a sufficiently large number µ for the function g µ = µ(|y|+|z|), then it is a g-expectation. This domination inequality (2.5) has been applied as a testing criteria in our data analysis. The results strongly support that both the market pricing mechanism and the bid-ask pricing mechanism under our investigation can be modelled as g-expectations, and that the bidask prices are then produced by this single mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the notion of gexpectation and show that, for each well-defined function g it satisfies the basic conditions (A1)-(A4) of a dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives. We then show that, a dynamic pricing mechanism dominated by a g µ -expectation, i.e., (2.5) is satisfied, is a g-expectation. In Section 3, we will present some equivalent conditions to show that the behaviors of a g-expectation are perfectly reflected by its generating function g. We also provide some examples and explain how to statistically find the function g by testing the input-output data of prices.
In Appendix 4.2 we apply the crucial domination inequality (2.5) to test the market pricing mechanisms and the bid-ask pricing mechanisms of S&P500 index future options and S&P500 index options, using data of parameter files provided by CME and CBOE. The result supports that they are g-expectations.
Application of the dynamic expectations and pricing mechanisms is to risk measures. Axiomatic conditions for a (one step) coherent risk measure was introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath 1999 [2] and, for a convex risk measure, by Föllmer and Schied (2002) [29] . Rosazza Gianin (2003) studied dynamic risk measures using the notion of g-expectations in [55] (see also [50] , [3] , [4] ) in which an additional condition of cash translatability is assumed.
2 The pricing mechanisms and g-pricing mechanisms by BSDE Let us consider a market of financial derivatives in which the price (S t ) t≥0 of the underlying assets is driven by a d-dimensional Brownian motion (B t ) t≥0 in a probability space (Ω, F , P ). Here S is an m-dimensional process, namely the number of the underlying assets is m. We assume that the past information F S t of the price S before t coincides with that of the Brownian motion:
A derivative X with maturity T is an F T -measurable and square-integrable random value called maturity value is denoted by X ∈ L 2 (F T ). The market price Y t of this derivative at time t < T is assumed to be in L 2 (F t ). Let us consider a BSDE model of a pricing mechanism of derivatives, where Y t is the solution of the following BSDE:
Here (Y, Z) a pair of the adapted processes to be solved, g is a given function
We call g the generating function of the BSDE. It satisfies the following basic assumptions for each ∀y,ȳ ∈ R and z,z ∈ R d ,
It is important to consider the following special situation:
Obviously (b) implies (a). This BSDE (2.1) was introduced by Bismut [6] , [7] for the case where g is a linear function of (y, z). [40, Pardoux-Peng, 1990 ] obtained the following fundamental result: for each X ∈ L 2 (F T ), there exists a unique square-integrable adapted solution (Y, Z) of the BSDE (2.1). The following notion of g-expectations was introduced by [44, Peng 1997a] and [45, Peng 1997 ].
Definition 2.1 We denote by
As an example, we consider the following Black-Scholes pricing mechanism: + and put option X = (k −S T ) + , where k is the strike price, under the assumption that r, b and σ are constant. Their main idea can be easily adapted to our slightly more general situation for a derivative X ∈ L 2 (F T ) with maturity T . Consider an investor with the following investment portfolio at a time t ≤ T : he has n 0 (t) bonds and n(t) stock, i.e., he invests n 0 (t)S 0 (t) in bond and π(t) = n(t)S(t) in the stock. We define by Y t the investor's wealth invested in the market at time t:
We make the so called "self-financing assumption":
We denote g(t, y, z) := −r t y − (b t − r t )σ −1 t z. Then, by denoting Z t = σ t π(t), the above equation is
We observe that the above function g satisfies (2.2 [5] , [14] and [24] : the investor is allowed to borrow money at time t at an interest rate R t > r t . The amount borrowed at time t is equal to (Y t − π(t))
− . In this case the wealth process Y still satisfies BSDE:
− . This derives a g-pricing mechanism with a sub-additive generating function g.
Similar equations appear in continuous trading with short sales constraints with different risk premium for long and short positions (cf. [37] , [32] and [24] ). In this case g(t, y, z) := −r t y − (b t − r t )σ
We observe that in each of the above three examples, g is sub-additive in (y, z).
The following result, obtained in [50] -Theorem 3.4, explains why this gexpectation is a good candidate to model a dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives: 
Proposition 2.4 Let the generating function g satisfies (2.2) and (2.3)-(a). Then the above defined g-expectation E g [·] is a dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives, i.e., it satisfies, for each
t ≤ T < ∞, X,X ∈ L 2 (F T ), (A1) E g t,T [X] ≥ E g t,T [X], a.s., if X ≥X; (A2) E g T,T [X] = X; (A3) E g s,t [E g t,T [X]] = E g s,T [X]; for s ≤ t; (A4) 1 A E g t,T [X] = E g t,T [1 A X], ∀A ∈ F t ,
Remark 2.6 The meaning of condition (A4) is that, since at time t, the agent knows the value of whether
From the above results we see that E g is a good candidate to be a dynamic pricing mechanism. The following result provides a criteria to test if a dynamic pricing mechanism is a g-expectation. The proof can be found in [52] . 
is called a dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives if it satisfies (A1)-(A4) (with
E gµ is a g-expectation with the generating function g µ defined by
Then there exists a unique generating function g(ω, t, y, z) satisfying (2.2) and (2.3)-(a) such that, for each t ≤ T and for each derivative
namely E is a g-expectation.
Remark 2.9 This theorem also implies that, for a generating function g satisfying (2.2) and (2.3)-(a)
, the corresponding g-expectation E g is also dominated by E gµ , i.e., (A5) is satisfied. This can be also directly proved by using the comparison theorem of BSDE.
Remark 2.10 It turns out that the domination condition (2.5) becomes a crucial criteria to test whether a dynamic pricing mechanism of derivatives is a g-expectation. We provide a test in Appendix 4.2 to use market data to check the inequality (2.5).

Remark 2.11
This deep result has non-trivially generalized the main result of [13] , theoretically and practically, where a special case g = g(t, z) with g(s, 0) ≡ 0 is considered. The g-expectation originally introduced in [45] corresponds such situation of "zero interest rate". (cf. Proposition 3.8, or [50] ).
Markovian pricing mechanisms We limit ourselves to consider, for each fixed maturity T , the derivatives X depending only on the price S T , i.e., X is a path independent derivative. X is then in the class of
where
. In other words, the price of a path-independent option by a Markovian pricing mechanism is still pathindependent.
Example 2.12 We consider a situation where the underlying price S is a diffusion process:
where b and Λ are given Lipschitz functions of R n valued on R n and R n×d respectively. If a generating function g has the following form:
where f is a Lipschitz function of (s, y, z) ∈ R n × R × R d . By the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula introduced in [42, Peng 1991] , [43, Peng 1992] and developed in [41, Pardoux-Peng 1992] , for each option X = Φ(S T ) with smooth function Φ the price of the related g-expectation is
Brownian motion, i.e., Λ(s) = σs and b(s) = µs, then the above PDE becomes
The Black-Scholes formula corresponds to the case f = −ry − (µ − r)σ −1 z. We then have
3 Characterization of g-pricing mechanism by its generating function g
For a pricing mechanism, it is important to distinguish the selling price and buying price of a same pricing mechanism, corresponding to the ask price and the bid price if the mechanism under investigation is generated through the system of market makers of an option market (cf. [33] Sec. 6.5 and [39] ). If E t,T [X] is the ask price at the time t of a derivative X with maturity T , then the bid price must be −E t,T [−X] and we have, in general,
Here we stress our point of view that, in fact, the ask price and bid price are produced by a single mechanism, called bid-ask pricing mechanism of market makers. Our result of data analysis to test the criteria (A5) of the domination condition (2.5) strongly supports this point of view. Moreover, this analysis also supports our point of view that, for a well-developed market, there exist a function g satisfying Lipschitz condition (2.2) such that the corresponding ask-bid pricing mechanism is modeled by the g-expectation
. A rational dynamic pricing mechanism also possesses some other important properties, such as convexity, sub-additivity. See [2] , [3] , [4] , [11] , [26] , [27] , [24] , [29] , [31] , [46] , [55] , [35] , [36] among many others. We will see that the generating function g perfectly reflects the behavior of E g . This may play an important role to statistically find g by using the corresponding data of prices. In the following we provide several theoretical results with proofs given in Appendix. This problem was treated also by [55] , [35] and [36] . 
In particular,
if and only if g ≡ḡ.
Corollary 3.2 The following two conditions are equivalent:
g(t, y, z) ≥ −g(t, −y, −z), a.e., a.s.,
Proof. We denoteḡ(t, y, z) := −g(t, −y, −z) and compare the following two BSDE:
From the above Proposition it follows that 
(resp. ≥ αg(t, y, z)
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism (E g t,T [·]) 0≤t≤T <∞ is convex (resp. concave), i.e., for each fixed α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Proposition 3.4 The following two conditions are equivalent: (i)
The generating function g is positively homogenous in (y, z) ∈ R × R d , i.e., g(t, λy, λz) = λg(t, y, z), a.e., a.s.,
From the above two propositions we immediately have
Corollary 3.5 The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) The generating function g is sub-additive: for each
(y, z), (ȳ,z) ∈ R × R d , g(ω, t, y +ȳ, z +z) ≤ g(ω, t, y, z) + g(ω, t,ȳ,z), dt × dP , a.s., (ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism E g t,T [·] : L 2 (F T ) −→ L 2 (F t ) is is sub-additive: for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T and X,X ∈ L 2 (F T ) E g t,T [X +X] ≤ E g t,T [X] + E g t,T [X].
Proposition 3.6 The generating function g is independent of y if and only if the corresponding g-expectation satisfies the following "cash translatability"
property: for each t ≤ T ,
We consider the following self-financing condition:
] satisfies the self-financing condition if and only if its generating function g satisfies (2.3)-(a).
Proof. The "if" part is obvious. The "only if part":
Thus Z t ≡ 0 and then g(t, 0, Z t ) = g(t, 0, 0) ≡ 0.
"Zero-interest rate" condition:
Proposition 3.8 E g [·] satisfies the zero-interest rate condition if and only if its generating function g satisfies (2.3)-(b).
Proof.
For a fixed y ∈ R, we consider Y t := E g t,T [y] ≡ y. Let Z t be the corresponding Itô's integrand in Y :
But this is equivalent to
Y t ≡ y, Z s ≡ 0, g(s, y, 0) ≡ 0. For eachz i0 · ∈ L 2 F (0, T ) E t,T [X] + t 0z i0 s dB i0 s = E t,T [X + T tz i0 s dB i0 s ] (3.2)
Proposition 3.9 Condition (3.2) holds if and only if g(t, y, z) does not depends on the
i 0 -th component z i0 of z ∈ R d .
Proposition 3.10
The following condition are equivalent:
is a deterministic number; (ii) The corresponding pricing generating function g is a deterministic function of (t, y, z)
The proof is similar as the others. We omit it. 
, where t is the present time. It is the solution of the following BSDE
Y s =z · (B T − B t ) + T s g(Z u )du − T s Z u dB u , s ∈ [t, T ].
It is seen that the solution is
Y s =z · (B s − B t ) + T s g(z)ds, Z s ≡z. Thus E g t,T [z · (B T − B t )] = Y t = g(z)(T − t), or g(z) = (T − t) −1 E g t,T [z · (B T − B t )]. (3.3)
Thus the function g can be tested as follows: at the present time t: if the valuation E g t,T [z · (B T − B t )] of (a toy model of ) derivativez · (B T − B t ) is obtained, then g(z) is explicitly given by (3.3). We observe that, in the case where S is a geometric Brownian motion, B T −B t can be expressed as a function of S T /S t . But this cannot be applied to a general situation.
Remark 3.12
The above test is also applied for the case g : [0, ∞) × R d → R, or for a more general situation g = γy + g 0 (t, z).
An interesting problem is, in general, how to find the generating function g by a testing of the input-output behavior of E g [·]? Let b : R n −→ R n , σ : R n −→ R n×d be two Lipschitz functions. For each (t, x) ∈ R + × R n , we consider the SDE of the form
This SDE is regarded as the equation of the price of the underlying stock. The following result was obtained in Proposition 2.3 of [8] .
Proposition 3.13 We assume that the generating function g satisfies (2.2). We also assume that, for each fixed
(y, z), g(·, y, z) ∈ D 2 F (0, T ) (the space of all F t -
adapted processes with RCLL paths). Then for each
(t, x, p, y) ∈ [0, ∞) × R n × R n × R, we have L 2 -lim ǫ→0 1 ǫ [E g t,t+ǫ [y + p · (X t,x t+ǫ − x)] − y] = g(t, y, σ T (x)p) + p · b(x).
Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 3.1-3.10
We begin with introducing some technique lemmas. The first one is called decomposition theorem of E g -supermartingale. The proof can be find in [47] and [50] .
Proposition 4.1 We assume (2.2). Let
Then there exists a unique F t -adapted increasing and RCLL process A ∈ D 
we consider the following SDE of Itô's type defined on [t, T ]:
We have the following classical result of Itô's SDE.
Lemma 4.2 We assume that f satisfies the same Lipschitz condition (2.2) as for g. Then there exists a constant C, depending only on µ, T and E
, where
For each n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , we set
It is clear that f n is an F t -adapted process.
Lemma 4.3 For each fixed
Proof. Let us fix y and z. We define f n (s, y, z) as in (4.3). It is clear that,
We thus have 4.6.
We now can give the proofs of several propositions given in the previous section. The method is very different from [55] , [35] and [36] where Proposition 3.13 plays a central role.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (i)⇒(ii) is the well-known comparison theorem of BSDE (cf. [43] and [24] ). , z), r ≥ t.
where we set
But since the price generating function g is convex in (y, z), we have ψ ≥ 0. It then follows from the comparison theorem that
We set Y s := αY t,y,z s
Thus the process Y is a E g -supermartingale defined on [t, T ]. It follows from the decomposition theorem, i.e., Proposition 4.1, that, there exists an increasing process A such that
We compare this with
It follows that Proof of Proposition 3.6 We first prove the "If" part. For each fixed We then can apply Lemma 4.4 to obtain that, for each (y,
Namely, g is independent of y. "Only if part": For each for each
, we have 
we have
This means that (3.2) holds. The "only if" part: For each fixed (t, y, z), let (Y t,y,z s ) s≥t be the solution of (4.1) with f = g. We have,
Since the process
From which we deduce Z s =z :
It then follows from Lemma 4.4 that g(t, y,z) = g(t, y, z), t ≥ 0, a.e., a.s.,
i.e., g does not depend the i 0 -th component of z ∈ R d .
Testing the criteria (A5) by market data
With Chen L. and Sun P. of our research group, we proceed a data test for the criteria (A5), i.e., the domination inequality (2.5), to check if a specific pricing mechanism is a g-expectation, or g-pricing mechanism E g . We have firstly tested the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange)'s market pricing mechanism of derivatives by taking the daily closing prices of options with S&P500 index futures as the underlying asset. The data is obtained from parameter files published from CME's fpt-webset, named cmeMMDDs.par (MM for month, DD for day) of call and put prices, from 05 January 2000 to November 2003, of totally 960 trading days. The corresponding S&P500 future's prices is obtained from the parameter files of SPAN (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) system downloaded from CME's ftp site.
We denote by In the above inequalities the data of the left hand sides is the market prices of options taken from CME parameter files. In our testing the transaction cost is neglected, i.e., we assume that E The other 12 violations are the cases where the time T − t is too short (less than 2 days).
Since we have not found available data of bid-ask prices of the above options from CME, we then have tested the bid-ask pricing mechanism of S&P500 index options operated by the system of market makers of CBOE The data source is from Yahoo's finance quotes of the option prices from 07 December to 08 May 2006. We have collected the prices of 5,000 time points, i.e., 5,000 different t among 100 trading days. We denote this pricing mechanism by E mm t,T [X] for the ask price of an option X. According to our point of view the bid price of the same X is −E .7) and (4.8) , with E mm in the place of E m . Only 1 case of violation appears. We will report these test results in details in our forthcoming paper. [9] .
